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1.  According to a popular line of reasoning, vagueness creates a problem 
for the endurantist conception of persistence.1 Assuming that ordinary mate-
rial objects can undergo some mereological change without thereby ceasing 
to exist, just how much change they can tolerate appears to be a vague mat-
ter. Surely a cat—Tibbles—can lose a few body cells, but surely it cannot 
lose too many of them, so it seems that we are bound to be faced with “bor-
derline cases” in which we are unsure what to say. For a perdurantist, such 
considerations pose no serious threat. If ordinary objects are things that per-
sist through time by having a different temporal part at each moment at 
which they exist, just as they extend over space by having a different spatial 
part at each place at which they are found, then the borderline cases can be 
explained in familiar semantic terms: our linguistic practices are not precise 
enough to determine the exact temporal extent of the referent of such ex-
pressions as ‘Tibbles’ or ‘that cat’, just as they are not precise enough to 
determine the exact spatial extent of the referent of expressions such as 
‘Everest’ or ‘that mountain’. By contrast, the endurantist would seem to be 
committed to a different account. If ordinary objects are things that persist 
through time by being wholly present at each moment at which they exist, 
and if it is indeterminate whether a certain number of body cells suffices to 
constitute a whole cat, then the borderline cases correspond to times at 
which it is indeterminate whether a cat exists at all. To the extent that our 
expressions for existence are not capable of harboring semantic vagueness 
(e.g., because they belong to our logical vocabulary), this means that the 
endurantist can only regard the borderline cases as a sign of epistemic or 
ontic vagueness—a problem. 
                                                
1. See e.g. Heller (1990: 49ff), Le Poidevin (2000), and especially Sider (2001, §4.9). 
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In some recent articles, Kathrin Koslicki (2003: 121f), Jonathan Lowe 
(2005), and Kristie Miller (2005a, 2006) object that this popular line of rea-
soning is inconclusive. The perdurantist’s account of the vagueness in ques-
tion—they argue—does not come for free: it depends on the assumption 
that there are enough objects to serve as “good candidates” for being the 
referent of a vague term. In particular, the perdurantist’s account is typically 
formulated on the assumption that composition is fully unrestricted across 
time—an assumption that can be put thus (following Sider 2001: 133): 
Unrestricted Diachronic Composition (UDC): For any class of time instants, I, 
and any function ƒ assigning a non-empty class of objects, ƒ(t), to each t in I, 
there is something, x, that exists exactly at the times in I and that at each such 
time t is composed exactly of the objects in ƒ(t). 
For a perdurantist, the object x whose existence is guaranteed by UDC is a 
(temporally extended) mereological fusion whose t-parts, at every given 
time t, are composed of the t-parts of the objects in ƒ(t). And when the per-
durantist says that a name such as ‘Tibbles’ is semantically vague, she 
means to say that our linguistic practices do not select a unique such fusion 
as the referent of that name: there are many fusions that fit the bill, many 
largely (temporally) overlapping objects differing from one another only in 
a few temporal parts at either “end”.2 Very well, says the objection. Sup-
pose we find this account plausible. Why should it be a prerogative of the 
perdurantist? What prevents the endurantist from endorsing UDC and pro-
viding a perfectly parallel account of the vagueness of ‘Tibbles’? 
Indeed, nothing prevents the endurantist from making this move. As 
Koslicki, Miller, and Lowe correctly point out, a mereologically promiscu-
ous endurantist is free to accept UDC holus bolus while at the same time 
rejecting, for each choice of ƒ, the identification of the relevant x with a 
temporally extended mereological fusion. The endurantist can construe x as 
an entity which, for each time t in the domain of ƒ, is wholly present at t and 
is entirely composed of (though distinct from) the objects in ƒ(t). And she 
can do so for any ƒ whatsoever. In short: A mereologically promiscuous en-
durantist is free to say that for any sequence of times and classes of body 
                                                
2. In saying this, the perdurantist is also assuming that the referent of ‘Tibbles’—a cat—
is nothing over and above a (temporally extended) aggregate of body cells. We’ll 
come back to this in Section 2.  
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cells existing at those times, there is an enduring object that exists at just 
those times and is constituted at those times by those body cells.3 Accord-
ingly, the endurantist could then provide an account of the vagueness of a 
name such as ‘Tibbles’ that is perfectly analogous to the perdurantist’s ac-
count. There are lots of good candidates for being the referent of that name 
—the endurantist can say—lots of continuants that currently consist of the 
same body cells but that differ slightly in their persistence conditions, and 
our linguistic practices are not precise enough to select a unique such candi-
date over the others.  
Very well, then. There are no obvious reasons why the endurantist 
should reject UDC, so no obvious reasons to conclude that vagueness cre-
ates a special problem for the endurantist conception of persistence. Are 
there, however, any good reasons to draw this conclusion?  
2.  It wouldn’t be a good reason to do so just because UDC would force the 
endurantist to inflate her ontology way beyond what common sense would 
acknowledge. As Lowe (2005: 110) puts it,  
it may indeed be that endurantism has common sense on its side in its rejec-
tion of talk of temporal parts, but that doesn’t mean that endurantism must be 
entirely bound by all the constraints of common sense—as though perduran-
tism represented exciting “revisionary” metaphysics while endurantism is for 
stick-in-the-mud common-sense realists.  
Nor would it be a good reason to complain that UDC would entail a 
commitment to instantaneous objects (among other things). In his reply to 
Koslicki, Ted Sider (2003: 136) says that such a commitment would put the 
endurantist in an embarrassing situation:  
I suspect that most [endurantists] would react thus: ‘If I needed to accept that 
(ubiquitous instantaneous objects), I might as well concede any remaining dif-
ferences and accept [perdurantism]’.  
On the face of it, however, some endurantists may not concede the remain-
ing differences: as Miller (2005a: 319f) argues, one could still deny that 
                                                
3. This is the natural way to cash out UDC in endurantist terms. Miller (2006) distin-
guishes two further variants, corresponding to different ways of construing ƒ(t). What 
follows is not significantly affected by such refinements.  
4 
persisting objects are mereological fusions of instantaneous things.4 Alter-
natively, the endurantist may happily concede all the differences and yet 
deny the embarrassment: as Lowe (2005: 109f) argues, one might insist that 
the disagreement is purely verbal, perdurantism and endurantism being 
translatable into each other without remainder.5 Either way, the endurantist 
would be free to endorse UDC and resist the objection from vagueness on 
such grounds.  
But now consider the following. According to Lowe (2005: 110),  
it won’t do for the perdurantist to object that the endurantist is committed to a 
plethora of spatially coinciding 3D objects, for this only corresponds exactly 
to the perdurantist’s own plethora of temporally overlapping 4D objects.   
Here one may disagree. There certainly is a perfect correspondence between 
the two plethoras. But one thing is spatial coincidence, another temporal 
overlap (i.e., sharing of temporal parts), and this is not a distinction without 
a difference when it comes to exploiting such plethoras for the purpose of 
explaining vagueness in semantic terms. On the contrary, the distinction 
makes all the difference.  
For consider what happens with the vagueness of ‘Tibbles’. Pick a time 
t0 and suppose we agree that Tibbles exists at t0. Indeed, suppose t0 is the 
time at which we decide to baptize a cat with the name ‘Tibbles’. This 
means that all the admissible candidates for the referent of that name—and 
there may be a plethora of them—must exist at t0. Moreover, assuming for 
simplicity that our baptismal act does not suffer from spatial vagueness, 
all such candidates must be things that are composed, at t0, of the same class 
of body cells, C0, i.e., objects whose assignment functions ƒ agree on the 
value ƒ(t0 ) = C0. Now: 
(A) For the perdurantist, this simply amounts to saying that all such 
candidates must have a t0-part. Indeed, they must have the same t0-part, Tib-
bles-at-t0, which is something composed, at t0, of the body cells in C0. To 
say that Tibbles-at-t0 is composed, at t0, of the body cells in C0 is to say that 
                                                
4. Actually, Correia (2005b) argues that a commitment to instantaneous objects implies 
a commitment to instantaneous temporal parts, which is at odds with the endurantist 
conception under discussion. We’ll come back to this in Section 4.  
5. See also Miller (2005b). The inter-translatability between perdurantism and endu-
rantism is further defended in McCall and Lowe (2003, 2006) and Hirsch (2005). 
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that Tibbles-at-t0 is composed (simpliciter) of the t0-parts of the body cells 
in C0. And since a perdurantist is likely to construe composition extension-
ally, this boils down to saying that all the admissible candidates for the ref-
erent of ‘Tibbles’ have, as their t0-part, the mereological fusion of the t0-
parts of the body cells in C0. Thus, for the perdurantist there are lots of 
things existing at t0 (in the relevant region of space) but just one thing that is 
entirely present at t0 (in that region of space): their common t0-part. There is 
nothing special about this, just as there is nothing special about the fact that 
many different things may share a common spatial part: every admissible 
referent of ‘Everest’ must include the peak of the mountain, at location s0, 
but there is just one thing located entirely at s0: their common s0-part. It is 
precisely this analogy between temporal existence and spatial location that 
allows the perdurantist to put forward a uniform semantic account of the 
temporal vagueness of ‘Tibbles’ and the spatial vagueness of ‘Everest’: it’s 
hard to pick out a temporally extended cat from a single stage, just as it is 
hard to pick out a spatially extended mountain from the peak. 
(B) For the endurantist, the picture is altogether different. Endurantism 
rejects temporal parts and, with them, the analogy between space and time 
that makes the perdurantist’s account so straightforward. Thus, for the endu-
rantist the many admissible candidates for the referent of ‘Tibbles’ would 
have to be entirely present at t0: they would not temporally overlap; they 
would spatially coincide. They would all be composed of the same class of 
body cells, C0, yet they would all be distinct.6 And they would be distinct 
precisely in virtue of their having distinct persistence conditions. Now, spa-
tial coincidence is no big deal for some endurantists: following Wiggins 
(1968), some take it to be a genuine possibility—in fact, a necessity—
precisely as a result of the many puzzles of material constitution and dia-
chronic change.7 But here the deal is big indeed. For insofar as the number 
of borderline cases for ‘Tibbles’ may be very large, the endurantist would 
be forced to countenance a correspondingly large number of fully coinci-
dent objects—coincident objects of the same kind. And she would be forced 
to say that the vagueness of ‘Tibbles’ is due to the fact that our linguistic 
                                                
6. And they would all be distinct from the fusion of the body cells in C0. To be sure, the 
endurantist could maintain that all such things are identical at t0, though different at 
other times. Again, we’ll come back to this option in Section 4. 
7. Lowe (1983) follows Wiggins on this score. Compare also Koslicki (2004).  
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practices are not precise enough to select one such object over the others as 
the official referent of that name. This would certainly be isomorphic to the 
account offered by the perdurantist. But as an explanation of the limits of 
our linguistic practices, this would be utterly incredible. It wouldn’t just be 
that we fail to pick out a unique cat among the many cat candidates that en-
sue from the amount of feline tissue that is in front of us at t0. Our practices 
would be imprecise because we fail to pick out a unique entity among the 
many indiscernible cat candidates that are, fully and distinctly, in front of us 
at t0. This is not a semantic account of the vagueness of ‘Tibbles’; it is an 
acute version of the problem of the many. 
Indeed, the picture is much worse than that. For UDC puts no restric-
tion whatsoever on the number of assignments ƒ such that ƒ(t0) = C0. Thus, 
not only would the endurantist be forced to countenance one fully coinci-
dent object for each possible referent of ‘Tibbles’. By accepting UDC, she 
would be forced to countenance one fully coincident object for each such 
assignment. And on any reasonable count, there are uncountably many as-
signments that fit the bill—uncountably many objects that right now would 
consist of the very same body cells but that would differ from one another 
by virtue of differences that would manifest themselves in the future, or that 
manifested themselves in the past. For the record, these would include ob-
jects that suddenly came into existence, such as those whose assignment 
function is not defined for t < t0, as well as objects that will suddenly pop 
out of existence, such as those whose assignment function is not defined for 
t > t0; they would also include objects that are exactly alike and coincide 
throughout their lives except for some negligible t ≠ t0, as well as objects 
that are completely different and spatially apart throughout their lives ex-
cept for t = t0; and so on. This plethora of entities would be in one-to-one 
correspondence with the entities accepted by a perdurantist committed to 
UDC, so the endurantist is right in rejecting up front any crude objection 
from ontological parsimony. But the claim that all such entities are entirely 
present at t0, rather than merely overlapping at t0, would deprive the corre-
spondence of any straightforward appeal, and the objection would most de-
finitely strike back. 
3.  Of course, one could reply that a mereologically promiscuous endu-
rantist is not committed to the massive spatial coincidence that we have just 
described. There are two obvious ways of doing this, at least in principle. 
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On the one hand, the endurantist could simply accept the plethora of 
objects that come with UDC while insisting that only one thing exists at t0, 
treating composition as identity and identity itself as an “occasional” rela-
tion à la Gallois (1998), i.e., as a relation that may obtain at some times but 
not at others. On this view, the vagueness of ‘Tibbles’ could still be ex-
plained in semantic terms: although there is only one cat present at t0, when 
the name is introduced, there are numerous descendants that could legiti-
mately qualify as the enduring bearers of that name—numerous cat-like en-
tities sharing the same origin and differing slightly in their persistence con-
ditions. To many philosophers, however, occasional identity is just as unin-
telligible as ontic vagueness, or wholesale epistemic vagueness, so one can 
hardly hope to block the argument from vagueness on such grounds.8 
On the other hand, the endurantist could insist that the plethora of ob-
jects that come with UDC are not genuine entities but entia successiva à la 
Chisholm (1976): really, there is just one class of body cells in the location 
in question at t0, hence only one cat constituted by those body cells, hence 
only one candidate for the name ‘Tibbles’. What is indeterminate, on this 
view, is not which of many different enduring objects is the referent of 
‘Tibbles’, but only which of many different selection functions ƒ picks out 
the sequence of those classes of body cells whose members successively 
constitute the one cat that is present at t0—a temporal variant of a familiar 
solution to the spatial problem of the many.9 However, this would hardly 
qualify as a semantic explanation of the vagueness in question. Constitution 
is an ontological relation. Thus, if it is indeterminate which sequence is the 
one whose members successively constitute the single enduring candidate 
for the name ‘Tibbles’, then it is indeterminate how things are. Indeed, since 
a cat can only exist at those times at which something constitutes it, it fol-
lows that there are times at which it is indeterminate whether or not the sin-
gle enduring candidate for the name ‘Tibbles’ exists. Hence, there are times 
when the number of objects in existence (including not just body cells and 
sums thereof, but objects such as cats) is not determinate. If cats were no-
thing over and above the sums of body cells that successively constitute 
                                                
8. Lowe does not consider this possibility, nor does Koslicki. But see Miller (2006: §4).  
9. See Lowe (1995). In correspondence, Lowe has clarified that this is indeed how he 
sees things, his defense of the profligate version of endurantism being meant as a 
mere formal reply to the argument from vagueness.  
8 
them—if they were themselves the entia successiva of those sums of cells—
then we could still see this as a product of semantic indecision. But to make 
that assumption is to accept mereological essentialism, and we already 
know that mereological essentialism provides a (radical) way out of the ar-
gument from vagueness (see Sider 2001: 180ff). The argument is meant to 
apply to those versions of endurantism that accept the initial assumption to 
the effect that a cat is a genuine denizen of reality that can change its mere-
ological composition, so this option is not on the table. The indeterminacy is 
truly ontological. 
4.  To be sure, there is a third way a promiscuous endurantist could avoid 
the objection from massive coincidence. So far we have been following 
Koslicki, Miller, and Lowe in assuming that endurantism finds the idea of 
temporal parts a repugnant one: to say that every object is “wholly present” 
at each moment at which it exists is tantamount to saying that no object can 
be partially present at any time, hence that no object can have proper tempo-
ral parts. Yet this popular line of thinking is by no means obvious. For one 
thing, the notion of something being wholly present at a time (hence the no-
tion of something being partially present) is notoriously a slippery one. 
There are two prima facie plausible ways of understanding this notion: 
(a) x is wholly present at t iff everything that is part of x at t exists at t. 
(b) x is wholly present at t iff anything that is ever part of x exists at t.  
As Sider (2001: 63ff) pointed out, however, neither formulation does the 
job properly. The first is too weak, since every perdurantist will agree with 
the right-hand side of (a); the latter is too strong, since only a mereological 
essentialist would accept the right-hand side of (b).10 Secondly, and more 
importantly, the notion of temporal part is itself somewhat slippery in this 
context. Sider’s by now classical definition is as follows (p. 59): 
(c) x is a temporal part of y at t iff (i) x exists only at t, (ii) x is part of y at t, 
and (iii) x overlaps at t everything that is part of y at t. 
On this basis, perdurantism is then identified with the thesis that, necessar-
ily, every object has a temporal part at each moment at which it exists. As 
                                                
10. For some recent attempts to define ‘x wholly present at t’, see Hughes (2005) and 
Crisp and Smith (2005).  
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Fabrice Correia (2005b: 500) pointed out, however, in the present context 
this definition is far from innocent, since it makes UDC incompatible with 
endurantism: every object turns out to have a Siderian temporal part at each 
moment it exists, namely, that instantaneous part whose existence is guaran-
teed by the smallest function ƒ that assigns to the moment in question the 
singleton of the object itself.11 Thus, one way or the other, the idea that en-
durantists are not entitled to temporal parts is not as obvious as one might 
have thought. Endurantism—one could argue—denies that persisting ob-
jects have a temporal dimension, in the sense of being “spread out” in time, 
but that doesn’t automatically preclude them from countenancing proper 
temporal parts.  
To illustrate this last thought, consider a butterfly and the caterpillar it 
came from: isn’t this a case where an endurantist might be willing to say 
that we have two distinct things, one existing after the other, that make up a 
single organism? As Correia puts it (p. 501):  
on the ordinary view, both the caterpillar and the butterfly have a life strictly 
shorter than the life of the organism, and at each time at which any one of 
them exists, it coincides [mereologically] with the organism. So … both the 
caterpillar and the butterfly are proper temporal parts of the organism.  
In a similar spirit, Christopher Hughes (2005: 473f) suggests that an endur-
ing statue made from some enduring clay may be regarded as a proper tem-
poral part of that portion of clay (assuming the clay outlasts the statue). And 
one could apply the same suggestion to describe objects such as Sydney 
Shoemaker’s (1988) klables as enduring entities whose morning parts are 
located in the kitchen while their afternoon parts are located in the living 
room. By analogy, then, one could describe the Tibbles scenario as one 
in which the plethora of cat candidates (and more) that come with UDC 
                                                
11. More precisely: let y be any object, t any instant at which y exists, I = {t}, and ƒ the 
function on I defined by ƒ(t) = {y}. Then UDC implies that there is some (instantane-
ous) object x that exists just at t and that at t is composed exactly of y. If ‘x is com-
posed of y at t’ means (plausibly) that x overlaps at t everything that overlaps y at t, 
and vice versa, then it follows that x is a temporal part of y at t. Since y and t were ar-
bitrarily chosen, this means that UDC implies that every (persisting) object has a 
(proper) temporal part at each moment at which it exists—perdurantism. Perhaps this 
is why Sider thinks that a commitment to instantaneous objects would put the endu-
rantist in an embarrassing situation, as seen in the quotation in Section 2.  
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are not mereologically disjoint enduring objects massively colocated at t0 
but, rather, enduring objects that literally coincide (mereologically) at t0. In 
other words, one could describe the Tibbles scenario as one in which the 
“longer” cat candidates—those that last longer—include the “shorter” ones 
as proper temporal parts even though each such thing is strictly speaking 
three-dimensional. And if this description is accepted, then the one-one cor-
respondence between the endurantist’s plethora of objects and the per-
durantist’s plethora would indeed be on equal footing, both ontologically 
and with regard to their role in the semantic account of the vagueness of 
‘Tibbles’.12 
Is the description acceptable? Doubtfully. One problem is that the ap-
peal to temporal parts does not by itself secure ontological parsimony. Take 
this caterpillar in front of you, which is located at region α, and consider the 
following questions:  
(1) How many caterpillars are there in front of you (at α)?  
(2) How many butterflies are there in front of you (at α)?  
(3) How many enduring organisms are there in front of you (at α)?  
On the view under examination, we are supposed to answer ‘One’ to (1) and 
‘Zero’ to (2), since the butterfly comes into existence as the caterpillar goes 
out. What about (3)? If the answer were ‘One’ (on account of the fact that 
right now the living organism is a caterpillar), then we would be back to 
occasional identity: the one organism that is now identical to a caterpillar 
would, by the same pattern, be identical to a butterfly at a later time, and the 
caterpillar is not the butterfly. So the answer must be: ‘Two’ (or more), viz. 
a shorter-lasting caterpillar, x, and a longer-lasting organism, y. Construing 
one enduring organism as a mereologically coincident temporal part of the 
other may help explain a number of things. It may even render the duplica-
tion tolerable. But a duplication it is.13  
                                                
12. Correia (2005b) makes this suggestion in his reply to Varzi (2005), where the objec-
tion from massive coincidence articulated in this paper is first outlined. For a more 
general account, see Correia (2005a). 
13. Compare: a philosopher such as Thomson (1998) would not hesitate to acknowledge 
that a statue is a spatial part of the lump of clay that constitutes it, and vice versa, 
holding that this would explain why the statue and the clay share all sorts of proper-
ties such as shape, weight, etc.; but that doesn’t take away the fact that her constitu-
tional ontology makes room for two objects in the same place at the same time.   
11 
Moreover, and quite independently, the analogy between the caterpil-
lar/butterfly case and the Tibbles case is moot. Pre-analytical intuitions 
about the former seem to depend significantly on the fact that ‘caterpillar’ 
and ‘butterfly’ are good candidates for what Wiggins (1980) called “sub-
stance sortals”, and a friend of sortalist metaphysics might therefore be in-
clined to think that they come with different identity criteria: no caterpillar 
is a butterfly, though a caterpillar and a butterfly may be construed as mak-
ing up a single living organism. By contrast, the putative temporal parts of 
the “longer” cat candidates that are present at t0, when the name ‘Tibbles’ is 
introduced, are sortally similar. It is precisely because they are sortally simi-
lar that the endurantist’s willingness to acknowledge cases of colocation of 
sortally different objects (such as a statue and the clay it comes from) is not 
sufficient to make sense of the plethora of colocated objects that come with 
UDC. Thus, if x1 is the enduring cat candidate that lasts until time t1 and x2 
the enduring cat candidate that lasts until a later time t2, the thought that x1 
is a temporal part of x2 cries for a justification that the caterpillar/organism 
example can hardly deliver. 
So perhaps endurantism is indeed compatible with temporal parts; but 
insofar as such parts do not belong to temporally extended wholes, their ac-
knowledgment falls short of dispensing of the problem. Endurantism is 
stuck with a choice between massive coincidence and occasional identity—
if not with an ontological account of the vagueness of persistence. 
5.  We conclude that the endurantist’s ego quoque fails. Yes, there is no ob-
vious reason why the endurantist should reject UDC, hence no obvious rea-
son to conclude that vagueness creates a problem for her conception of per-
sistence. There are, however, perfectly good reasons why the endurantist 
should better avoid UDC. And there are good reasons to suppose that even 
UDC, if accepted, would fail to provide the endurantist with the necessary 
resources for explaining vagueness—diachronic vagueness—in familiar se-
mantic terms. 
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